0:00
Hey, everybody, welcome back.
We're gonna pick up in this episode where we left off last time, and began discussing the historical-cultural context, that aspect of the rhetorical situation.
And we're also going to go into a pretty lengthy discussion of assumptions, or what we're also going to call presuppositions—[assumptions/presuppositions] together [are] another aspect of the rhetorical situation.
So [this episode is all about] the last two aspects of the rhetorical situation, as we've been discussing it.
0:32
Surrounding the occasion is the larger historical-cultural context. This context [also helps] shape the meaning of a particular occasion. But that's not all it does, it also [helps] shape the specific exigence of that occasion. There's a couple of other ways you could think about phrasing this. We could say, for example, the larger historical-cultural context surrounding a single occasion will actually help to create a certain exigence out of that occasion, or the two [the exigence and its occasion and surrounding context] are actually different ways of describing the same thing. The larger historical-cultural context helps give rise to a certain exigence. Or if you think about it a little differently, the particular occasion, the singular activity that you're involved in, helps give rise to a certain exigence relative to that particular activity. Do you know what a feedback loop is? That's how we're going to look at this—we look at this as a feedback loop. When we think about historical cultural context and exigence together; together, they're actually in this feedback loop, right? But it's kind of a relationship if you think about it. So the two together, the relationship that they are, really create the rhetorical situation where we are operating, where we are engaging in discourse, where we're trying to present certain arguments. Yeah, you know, let that sink in for a second. I mean, the drama of the implications of this... that is a big time wowzers! The feedback loop of the context and exigence in a relationship together, creating a rhetorical situation... Well, you know, anyway, I'm just gonna put that hot potato down before it starts to burn, and move on back to where we were.
2:29
So the historical-cultural context—by the way, I'm describing this [context] as a single entity, but I think you can consider the historical and the cultural on their own terms, and come away with two contexts—for now, let's think of them as one interconnected thing. A historical-cultural context can be small, like a decade, or it can be large, like an era of history. Anywhere along that scale is a valid measurement, I guess. We can speak of the Middle Ages, which is a very large historical epoch, or a smaller one, like the 60s—the 1960s, of course—as the historical-cultural horizon (which we can also think of—parenthetically—as the contextual frame) for a particular occasion. Or perhaps instead of the word occasion there—which, now that I think about it, can [seem] inaccessible, or not as effective as another way of representing this idea—let's [try drawing upon a more meaningfully familiar] word: experience. So let's use [the word "experience"] now to help us envision the sort of concept of the historical-cultural context.
3:59
And I'm just going to recap some of the things I've already said about it, the ways I've described it; so listen to this: the historical-cultural context, or what might be called the historical-cultural horizon, will shape the meaning of a particular (instead of occasion) experience. [The historical-cultural context/horizon] will shape the meaning of a particular experience, and the emotions that are involved [therein], the emotional character of that experience. So a particular experience, the story or narrative of an individual, may be framed by, or contextually framed by a historical-cultural horizon or context. That's really interesting, isn't it? To think of a rhetorical experience instead of a rhetorical occasion or even situation? "Occasion"... "situation"... these [terms] can be very numbingly cold or[, perhaps, even] disingenuous terms that can have great difficulty trying to communicate affect. "Affect" and "experience": these [terms] seem to synchronize together more naturally, more artistically, and less definitively or critically than thinking about it only as occasion or situation. The "occasional" [and] the "situational": these are still important terms; I'm not trying to downplay them, [but rather] I'm trying to uplift this idea of one of the essential faces of this [concept of the] historical-cultural context, one of the essential faces of the context.
5:44
And on that note, let's bring it to the last point, which are presuppositions. So, the presuppositions available in a rhetorical situation are part of the historical-cultural context. [That is,] they're the systems of ideas or the ways of thinking that the speaker and audience share, making them a community more or less. And let me go ahead and say that another way to think about presuppositions is with the word "assumptions." So we could say, when the speaker and audience share the same assumptions, they're on the same page—or at least in the same book, you know, the same ballpark. There's a sort of more immediately available, actionable potential between the speaker and the audience, [which potential is] sort of interstitially there. In other words, you can think of it like there's more usable electricity in the atmosphere. Yeah, okay.
6:42
So anyway, once their assumptions are clear, the two—the speaker and the audience—can proceed to a specific topic. When we say assumptions, what exactly do we mean? What does that include? Well, it includes things like love, hate, fear, admiration, what they yearn for, their sense of what is true and real, their sense of what is right and proper, their sense of what is logical, their sense of what should be said in a given situation, and, of course, what should not be said. I mean, as you can see, there's a host of possibilities with assumptions and presuppositions, but the way that these assumptions and presuppositions affects meaning is also important—not just what they are, but what they do, the influence that they exert. Taking this into consideration, it's no surprise to learn that assumptions and presuppositions can, in a very real sense, not only determine what the speaker means and what the audience understands, they can also determine how both the speaker and the audience understand the occasion. For example, if a disaster occurs, and the speaker and the audience both assume that a disaster calls for mourning and charity, then they will approve of a celebrity's effort at soliciting donations. Now, that's the case that the speaker and the audience share the same assumptions—their presuppositions match. But what about if there's a difference or a disconnect between these assumptions? [What if] they're not totally shared? What about that case? Then, maybe, disapproval can start to creep in, which can lead to argumentative tension, maybe even a shift in focus away from relief efforts, and instead turns more toward this emerging conflict. (I don't want to editorialize here, but maybe I'll imply that this is relevant to think about with regard to current events.)
8:50
So now finally, let's think about another variation of the same example of a disaster occurring, and then the subsequent rhetorical response to it. Here, we'll get away from the idea of a difference emerging between the speaker and the audience and go back to a shared assumption; but this time, that shared assumption or presupposition is different, namely that using a disaster to solicit donations is inappropriate, and that a celebrity's efforts to do so can only be self-promoting. [First,] remember—quick recap—the presuppositions available in a rhetorical situation include what [both] the speaker and audience feel about the subject, the genre, the situation, [and/or] each other; what both expect and perceive to be the facts, the meaning of certain words, and what is logical; what they know to be true and real, normal, likely, unlikely; what both believe about life and goodness; and what they love and hate and fear [and] admire [and] yearn for, [and so on]. Taken together and formed into a kind of set to be chosen from, some particular constitution of this set for a historical-cultural context, or, in our case, the occasion of the disaster, and the various experiences and responses that are associated with it or because of it, speakers and writers choose from these to create their arguments. So all these different items can become the sort of raw material out of which an argument is made. And they can be used to create, to build, to buttress, [and/or] to undercut an argument.
10:33
So, what we're seeing here, in a sense, is that the assumptions and presuppositions in a rhetorical situation can function as the bricks and mortar of an argument. And that's why it's so important for us to be aware of them. All right, cool. Now back to our final example, and I'll just remind you what it was real quick: this time, the shared assumption or presupposition between the speaker and the audience is different, namely that using a disaster to solicit donations is inappropriate, and that a celebrity's efforts to do so can only be self-promoting. What is an implication that we can derive from this? Well, for one, the speaker could use the shared assumption to undercut the argument of the celebrity. Now, this is useful for the speaker, if undercutting the celebrity's argument is their goal. Using that assumption in their speech or a piece of writing serves to offer a point of mutual recognition. And if the mutual recognition is successful—if the audience responds to it, [if they] become rhetorically responsive to it—then the likelihood of an intended effect's creation dramatically increases. I think this is sort of a "wow!" moment, you know, because, in a sense, [it means that] you can programmatically generate specific yields of argumentative effectiveness to target audiences. And I also think it gives a more tangible meaning to the whole idea of a target audience. And it also opens up new worlds of possibilities for public discourse to turn into more effective and forceful argumentation.
12:24
Now, this multiplication of possibilities brings with it a potential multiplication of overlooked, forgotten, and ambiguous assumptions, which can put the audience in a pretty bad spot. What the example teaches us is that it's a judgment call that you have to make when situations by necessity demand a swift decision. So of course, many such judgments will depend on the importance and urgency of the occasion. But it's in the actual context of that very urgent situation that the assignment of that important value has to be made. And because, in a sense, knowing what the multiplicity of possibilities are, and [then] choosing one or the other, are choices made by the speaker and writer, I think it would behoove us—and we have seen this as rhetoricians—to cultivate a sort of tact and a sort of empathy that allows us to consider each unique rhetorical situation, each unique rhetorical community, as a unique context in which values, goals, and consequences obviously have to be discovered, constructed, and deployed in the production of some events. And that's something that can help, you know. But for us, the trouble is, then, when hidden assumptions are made without our knowledge, without our full and immediate awareness of those assumptions. Once embedded, the assumption will take on an independent validity in the minds and hearts of our audience. And, you know, it could be one that may very well be unconsciously independent of the meaning we intend to give our argument. And so if I were the celebrity in the situation that we've been discussing, if I were to solicit for donations for relief—and this is why it's so important, so important for us to be aware of the possible silent assumptions that can creep into our reasoning, and to make sure that we are aware of them and consciously decide if and how our arguments depend on them.
14:41
So when we say things like, "Oh, that's a hidden assumption," we're naming the fact that the specific content of our speech or writing is informed by a chain of supposedly connected statements, one of which is a hidden assumption or an unstated statement. Hidden assumptions, hidden presuppositions, unstated statements: these can put the audience as well as the rhetorical analyst in the strange position of having to suss things out to see the unstated assumptions, to see them by making inferences about them, by asking themselves questions, like, "So what does this situation mean for me? for an audience? for someone else? for an audience I'm part of? an audience I'm not part of? I don't fully understand it, and therefore I'm taking it apart, I'm putting it together, I'm constructing it, I'm filling [the gaps] in, I'm trying to make it make sense in light of my experiences, my context, my knowledge, my 'what's allowed,' and so on." I mean, think about the potential chaos of misinterpretation that can come from having to work with unstated statements. You know, I mean, it's like the dark matter of rhetoric—the dark matter of rhetoric, the unstated statement. That's maybe a little dramatic, but I don't know.
16:08
Anyway, the final takeaway from this discussion of assumptions and presuppositions—which, again, is the last aspect of the rhetorical situation, as we've been discussing it—is this: any effort to understand the assumptions and presuppositions in a rhetorical situation is an effort to understand the rhetorical situation itself. That means to understand what [the rhetorical situation] is, what it does, and how it works. In other words, as rhetoricians, we are always trying to make sense of the world by paying attention to the smaller pieces that make it up. And the assumptions and presuppositions are some of the most important pieces.